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An Empirical Study on the Effects of 
Public Procurement on 
the Productivity and Survivability of SMEs: 
Case of the Korean Mining and Manufacturing Sectors 
By WOO HYUN CHANG* 
This paper empirically studies the effect of public procurement on 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the Republic of Korea 
using firm-level data. Public procurement, the purchase of goods and 
services from private firms by the public sector, is regarded as an 
important policy measure for providing support to firms, particularly 
SMEs. This study uses establishment-level panel data of the mining 
and manufacturing sectors from the Korean National Bureau of 
Statistics (Statistics Korea) and procurement history from the Korean 
Public Procurement Service to empirically estimate the effects of 
public procurement on firms’ productivity (total factor productivity) 
and survivability. Using a propensity score matching estimation 
method, we find that participating firms showed higher productivity 
than non-participating ones in the control group only for the year of 
participation, that is, 2009. After two years, in 2011, they exhibited 
significantly lower productivity. In contrast, establishments that 
participated in public procurement for SMEs in 2009 were more likely 
to survive than those that did not do so in 2011. These results can be 
interpreted as the negative consequences of government intervention. 
The market’s efficiency enhancement is hindered if underserving 
companies survive owing to government intervention but fail to 
improve efficiency. 
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 I. Introduction 
 
he public sector purchases goods and services from private-sector firms in 
order to operate. The primary objective of public procurement, the purchase of 
goods and services from private firms by the public sector, is similar to any 
optimizing entity in an economy: to purchase quality goods and services that are 
required at as low a price as possible. However, because public procurement 
decisions are controlled by the government, which is also responsible for other 
public policies, public procurement is regarded as an important policy measure for 
other policy purposes, such as supporting firms, particularly small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). 
However, there are few studies and little empirical evidence to demonstrate that 
public procurement indeed achieves its intended goals. Considering the significant 
size of the public procurement market and the number of contracts provided to 
SMEs, it is very important to evaluate the effectiveness of public procurement with 
regard to improving the performance capabilities of SMEs.  
To this end, on the basis of available information, the present study analyzes the 
impact of the public procurement support program of the government of the 
Republic of Korea (hereafter “Korea”) for SMEs on productivity, more specifically 
total factor productivity (TFP) and the survivability of individual establishments.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data and provides a 
basic data analysis. Section III explains the computation of TFP as a performance 
measure. Section IV details the estimation process and provides the estimation 
result. Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. Data and Basic Data Analysis 
 
A. Data to Measure the Performance of Establishments:  
Mining and Manufacturing Survey (2008–2011) 
 
This study uses Mining and Manufacturing Survey (MMS) data from Statistics 
Korea, the central government organization for statistics in Korea, to measure the 
performance of establishments. Chang (2014) used the same database to evaluate 
the effects of public financial support programs for SMEs. This study shares both 
the basic dataset from that study and the TFP computed using the Levinsohn–Petrin 
production function. 
The MMS covers every establishment with ten or more employees in 
manufacturing and mining every year. Although it has the limitation of excluding 
establishments in non-manufacturing sectors such as services, it has the advantage 
of enabling the researcher to analyze the effectiveness of public procurement for 
SMEs in the mining and manufacturing sectors comprehensively. Table 1 (Chang, 
2014) summarizes the descriptive statistics for the years 2008 and 2011 as well as 
the differences between the two years. 
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TABLE 1—MANUFACTURING AND MINING SECTORS, 2008–2011 
2008 
GDP Deflator 
2008:93.6 
2011:101.6 
# of 
Establishments 
Sales Profit Man Payment P/M 
Continuing 32,964 792,775,131 69,947,591 1,578,228 55,838,114 35.38 
Exited 25,236 416,703,202 48,099,603 839,056 25,836,348 30.79 
Entered - - - - - - 
Sum 58,200 1,209,478,332 118,047,195 2,417,284 81,674,492 33.79 
 
2011 
GDP Deflator 
2008:93.6 
2011:101.6 
# of 
Establishments 
Sales Profit Man Payment P/M 
Continuing 32,964 1,144,721,039 108,540,224 1,761,578 70,228,397 39.87 
Exited - - - - - - 
Entered 25,419 296,745,516 23,083,206 766,676 19,799,333 25.82 
Sum 58,383 1,441,466,555 131,623,430 2,528,254 90,027,730 35.61 
 
2011-2008, Difference 
 $ of 
Establishments 
Sales Operating 
Profit 
Employment Payment Payment/ 
Person 
Continuing 0 351,945,908 38,592,663 183,350 14,390,253 4.49 
Exited -25,236 -416,703,202 -48,099,603 -839,056 -25,836,348 -30.79 
Entered 25,419 296,745,516 23,083,206 766,676 19,799,333 25.82 
Sum 183 231,988,223 13,576,235 110,970 8,353,238 1.82 
Note: Values are in millions of KRW and are presented in 2011 prices; this includes establishments appearing both 
in the MMS and the Census of Establishments in 2008 and 2011. “Continued” indicates that firms existed both in 
2008 and 2011. “Exited” means that firms existed in 2008 but had exited by 2011. “Entered” means that firms did 
not exist in 2008 and entered between 2008 and 2011. 
Source: Mining and Manufacturing Survey (MMS; cited in Chang, 2014). 
 
According to Table 1, the Korean mining and manufacturing sectors are rather 
dynamic in terms of exits, entries and reallocations of resources. Among 58,200 
establishments reported in the MMS in 2008, only 32,964 (56.64%) continued to 
be operational in 2011. Altogether, 25,419 new establishments appeared, replacing 
25,236 establishments that had halted their operations by the time of the 2011 
survey.  
One important and interesting observation is that a great part of the sales (KRW 
352 trillion out of KRW 417 trillion), operating profits (KRW 39 trillion out of 
KRW 48 trillion), and payments for workers (KRW 14 trillion out of KRW 26 
trillion) lost from the establishments that had ceased operations were adequately 
replaced by the overall increase in the respective variables of those that continued. 
However, the employment scenario was different; 840,000 jobs were lost when the 
establishments ceased operations, but only 183,000 jobs were created by those that 
continued, with 767,000 new jobs created by entering establishments. Hence, new 
firms played a more important role from the perspective of employment growth. 
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B. Public Procurement Data of 2009 
 
Public procurement data are drawn from the Korean Public Procurement Service 
(PPS). Although the PPS does not handle all public purchases of goods and 
services in Korea, it is unquestionably the most important government body for 
public procurement and is responsible for major procurement contracts. The dataset 
compiled by the PPS is one of the best available for a comprehensive empirical 
analysis. 
This study mainly uses 2009 procurement data from the contract data provided 
by the PPS for the period of 2007–2015. Table 2 summarizes the number of 
establishments, number of contracts, total amount of the contracts, and the total 
number of contracts with SME exclusive bidding, which excludes large enterprises 
from the bidding process according to government regulations. The SME-exclusive 
bidding regulation can be interpreted as one of the strongest factors in favor of 
SMEs. 
For example, in 2007, the number of establishments that participated in the 
procurement market mediated by the PPS was 13,617 and the total number of 
contracts was 759,777 with a contract value of KRW 17.32 billion. Contracts of 
KRW 2.51 billion were awarded to SMEs with various SME-specific advantages 
during the bidding process. Note that the value of the SME-exclusive bidding 
contract increased significantly over time, reaching KRW 13.73 billion in 2015. 
 
TABLE 2—SUMMARY OF THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT DATABASE FROM  
THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SERVICE (PPS) 
Year # of Est. # of Contracts Amount Amount, SME-Exclusive 
2007 13,617 759,777 17,318 2,513 
2008 13,350 888,018 18,269 3,915 
2009 13,835 1,193,147 28,317 5,467 
2010 14,112 1,026,330 24,171 5,636 
2011 13,838 929,492 20,474 7,761 
2012 14,161 994,680 23,109 9,610 
2013 14,469 1,015,448 26,145 12,046 
2014 14,722 1,008,748 27,604 12,295 
2015 15,658 1,023,838 29,796 13,730 
Note: Contract amounts are in billions of KRW. 
Source: Data provided by the PPS. 
 
C. Merged Dataset 
 
According to the merged dataset, 3,096 establishments from the mining and 
manufacturing sectors were awarded KRW 13,244,109 billion in public 
procurement contracts in 2009. A total of 3,012 SMEs secured KRW 5,649,387 
billion in public procurement contracts that year.1 In addition, 84 large 
establishments from the mining and manufacturing sectors supplied the public    
 
1In this study, SMEs are defined as establishments that satisfy the following conditions: sales of less than 100 
KRW billion and fewer than 300 employees. 
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TABLE 3—NUMBER OF SMES, NUMBER OF SMES AWARDED  
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS, AND NUMBER OF SMES THAT  
WON WITH SME- EXCLUSIVE BIDDING PREFERENCES 
Total # of est. # of est. awarded SME-exclusive bidding 
2007 60,195 2,753 (4.57%) 576 (0.96%) 
2008 56,656 2,740 (4.84%) 562 (0.99%) 
2009 56,273 3,012 (5.35%) 977 (1.74%) 
2011 60,938 3,061 (5.02%) 1,668 (2.74%) 
 
sector with KRW 7,594,722 billion worth of goods and services. 
One important observation is that the number of establishments, including 
SMEs, is relatively small in the public procurement market. There were 56,273 
SMEs with ten or more employees in 2009, but only 3,012 SMEs were awarded a 
contrast in the public procurement market. Among those, 977 SMEs won SME-
exclusive bids. 
 
III. Estimating TFP as a Performance Indicator 
 
This section estimates an establishment-level production function using 
empirical data. The Levinsohn–Petrin (2003) approach to estimating production 
functions requires panel data with establishment-level capital, labor, and 
intermediate inputs. This paper uses panel data drawn from the MMS for the years 
2007, 2008, 2009, and 2011.2  
The MMS, conducted by Statistics Korea, is a complete, enumeration-based 
survey of establishments with at least ten employees in mining and manufacturing. 
It contains a sufficient number of the variables to estimate TFP values. In 
particular, the MMS includes variables related to the firms’ production costs, such 
as their power and water costs, which are proxies for the intermediate inputs 
needed to estimate the Levinsohn–Petrin production function. This makes the 
MMS one of the most appropriate databases for this paper’s methodology. 
For the capital variable, we use tangible assets owned by the establishment; 
however, we exclude land, which does not depreciate over time following the 
definition used in economics. For the labor variable, we use the number of 
employees for each establishment, whereas their power and water costs are used as 
proxies for intermediate inputs.3  
Although both value-added and revenue can be used as output measures when 
using the Levinsohn–Petrin production function method, we use the former given 
that it is a more general choice when the required information is available.  
The raw data include nominal values and therefore require a price adjustment 
over each time period. Because different variables may need different price indices, 
we use the producer price index for the output variables including value-added, 
 
2In 2010, the MMS was replaced by the Economic Census, which uses different standards from those used by 
the MMS. This made it difficult to employ a consistent treatment of capital stock at the establishment level. 
Therefore, data pertaining to 2010 was excluded from this paper’s analysis. 
3Either the number of employees or the labor costs can be used as the labor variable. This paper uses the 
former; robustness checks show that the results remain largely unchanged when using labor costs. 
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whereas we use the consumer price index for all labor costs.4 We use the final 
capital price index from the domestic supply price indices for all of the capital 
goods in the data. We use the power, gas, and water price indices from the producer 
price index to deflate the variables of the power and water costs.  
To compare the results of production functions, we initially conduct a baseline 
model regression analysis and then a regression analysis under restrictive 
conditions assuming a homogeneous function of degree 1, in addition to the 
Levinsohn–Petrin estimation. 
The baseline model regression analysis is based on the following specifications:5 
 
, , , ,In In Ini t i t i t i tY N K TFP      
 
,i tY  : Value-added produced by establishment i  at time t   
,i tN : Number of employees for establishment i  at time t  
,i tK : Value of tangible assets owned by establishment i  at time t   
(excluding non-depreciating assets) 
,i tTFP : Total factor productivity of establishment i  at time t  
 
Unlike the Levinsohn-Petrin model, this baseline model assumes that the 
establishment’s employment level is independent of productivity. This may lead to 
endogeneity, as productive firms are likely to employ more workers. 
Another model for the A regression analysis under restrictive conditions 
assuming a homogeneous function of degree 1 adds the condition 1    to   
the above specification. This specification follows the assumption that the original 
Cobb–Douglas production function is a homogeneous function of degree 1. 
Table 4 summarizes the estimation results of the three production functions 
discussed above.  
 
TABLE 4—ESTIMATION RESULTS OF PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS 
Levinsohn-Petrin OLS OLS with Constraints 
Log Labor Coefficient ( ) 0.76 (0.000) 0.94 (0.000) 0.77 (0.000) 
Log Capital Coefficient (  ) 0.19 (0.000) 0.22 (0.000) 0.23 (0.000) 
Note: Calculated by the author using MMS data of 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2011; P values in parentheses that show 
lower values indicate that the results are more statistically significant. The sample size for the Levinsohn–Petrin 
production function is 134,788 observations with information available on power and water costs from the MMS 
for 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2011, whereas the sample size for the other regression models is 238,365.6. 
 
4Given that the estimation results use the number of employees, the consumer price index is used only for 
robustness checks. 
5TFP of establishment i at time t; TFP is a residual term in the regression analysis where the dependent 
variable is the establishment’s value-added and labor, whereas capital inputs are independent variables. It consists 
of an intercept and an individual residual. 
6For the reference, if we only use 134,788 observations with power and water cost information for the OLS 
estimation, the log labor coefficient is 0.90 and the log capital coefficient is 0.24, with these values both 
statistically significant at P values of 0.000. For OLS with constraints, the log labor coefficient is 0.75 and the log 
capital coefficient is 0.25, also statistically significant with P values of 0.000 
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Table 4 shows that the baseline regression model overestimates the contribution 
of labor as a variable factor of production as compared to the Levinsohn–Petrin 
model. This is consistent with the expected result after considering the endogeneity 
problem that arises when firms with higher TFP levels use more variable inputs. 
 
IV. Procurement Policy Evaluation 
 
A number of econometric techniques have been developed for the policy 
evaluations. Among them, this study uses that known as propensity score matching 
estimation (PSME), which has been widely used in policy evaluations recently. 
Because the PSME is a non-parametric estimation technique, it can identify policy 
effects even when the variables have non-linear relationships. In addition, it 
produces credible results for policy evaluations because it only estimates the effects 
for the range where a control group that is similar to the treated group can be 
constructed. We also performed a multiple regression analysis as a robustness 
check.7  
Two assumptions underpin the use of the PSME. The first is that the treatment 
and control groups are equally likely to be assigned once their observational 
characteristics are properly controlled. This is based on the premise that 
observational variables capture the traits of each establishment effectively. Second, 
the probability of receiving the treatment cannot be 0 or 1 in individual 
observations. In other words, the PSME cannot be used when a certain condition 
always leads to treatment or non-treatment. For example, government financial 
support for households above a certain income level cannot be analyzed with the 
PSME. 
The MMS data used in this analysis satisfy the stipulations of the first 
assumption, as this data include diverse observable variables such as 
establishment-level capital, revenue, sales, profits, as well as the number of regular 
and total employees. In addition, these surveys enable the researcher to compute 
industry-level variables to control for the heterogeneity of industries. The data also 
meet the second assumption, as they can restrict the sample to those establishments 
that can receive support from the government.8  
To illustrate the PSME, we set the outcome of interest, the firm’s performance 
after policy intervention, as Y, which takes a value of 1 when the firm participates 
in the program and 0 otherwise. Firm performance  1
iY  indicates the performance 
of firm i  when it participates in the government assistance program. 0
iY  
indicates the performance of firm i  when it does not do so. i  indicates the 
policy impact of this program, and it can be expressed as 1 0 .
i i
i Y Y     
The most fundamental challenge during a policy evaluation is the observation of 
 
7OLS produces estimates for the range even when there is insufficient data based on a linear model. In 
contrast, PSME excludes the range when matching scores are not significant. 
8For the analysis here, we checked if any of these assumptions were violated by inspecting the propensity 
matching distribution and excluded observations with lower probabilities after calculating the propensity score. 
INSIDabcdef_:MS_0001MS_0001
IN
SI
D
ab
cd
ef
_:
M
S_
00
01
M
S_
00
01
8 KDI Journal of Economic Policy FEBRUARY 2017 
either 1
iY  or 0
iY  for firm i . If a firm participates in a government assistance 
program, its performance under no assistance cannot be observed. Likewise, if it 
does not participate in the program, its performance when receiving assistance 
cannot be observed.  
As noted above, the PSME introduces two key assumptions to address this 
problem. The first assumption is conditional independence, whereby the 
assignment of firms to the government program is determined by observables. This 
takes the following form: 
 
Assumption 1: 1 0( , )
i i
iY Y T X  
X  denotes the observables of the firms and iT  is a variable that takes a value 
of 1 when firm i  participates in the government assistance program and 0 
otherwise. This assumption implies that the assignment of firms is as good as 
random after controlling for observables. In the context of SME promotion policy, 
this means that there is no systematic difference between participating and non-
participating firms in the government program once the firm’s observable financial 
indicators, such as their capital, revenue, sales, profit, number of employees, wage 
levels, and the industry characteristics, are properly controlled.  
The second assumption is that within the data, some firms participate in the 
government program while others with similar characteristics do not. In other 
words, the probability of a firm participating should not be either 0 or 1 with 
reference to observables. This leads to the following equation: 
 
Assumption 2: 0 ( 1 ) 1i iP T X x      
If a firm has a probability of 1 to participate in a program given certain 
characteristics, firms with those characteristics always participate. Consequently, it 
is impossible to construct a non-participating firm with similar characteristics as a 
counterfactual for the treated group. If a firm has a probability of 0 to participate, it 
creates the same issue when attempting to produce a match. 
 
The following condition is met under the first assumption, illustrating a highly 
practical advantage of the PSME.9  
 
1 0( , ) ( ),
i i
iY Y T P x  where ( ) ( 1 )i iP x P T X x     
 
( )P x  is referred to as the propensity score, which is the probability that a firm 
with a characteristic x participates in a government assistance program. This 
condition is important because participating and non-participating firms can be 
compared on the basis of their propensity scores alone, thereby reflecting diverse 
variables. When more characteristics are controlled and these characteristics 
become more continuous, it becomes more difficult to find firms with identical 
characteristics. The propensity score technique helps mitigate this problem.  
 
9See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
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In this study, we adopted the following steps: 
 
Step 1: We combined the establishment’s inclusion in government support 
programs in 2009 and the corporate financial information for 2008 and 
2011 using the business registration number of the establishment. This 
allows for a comparison of the effects of public procurement at the 
establishment level.  
Step 2: We excluded data not relevant to this study’s analysis; we omitted firms 
with annual revenue greater than KRW 100 billion and with more than 
300 employees, as they are not eligible for government support to 
SMEs.10  
Step 3: We chose the characteristics of the control group to be used for matching 
with the treated group. This analysis includes the TFP, revenue, sales, 
profit, economic capital, the number of employees, the number of 
regular employees, the annual average payment per employee, and the 
annual average payment per regular employee for each establishment in 
2008.11 We also included industry-wide averages for these variables on 
the basis of the two-digit standard industrial classification12 in order to 
capture industry characteristics.13  
Step 4: We analyzed the policy effects after matching individual establishments 
on the basis of the propensity score calculated from the characteristics 
chosen in the previous steps. A logit model was employed to estimate the 
propensity score. To match treated observations to untreated 
observations, we chose the nearest neighbor (NN) matching algorithm. 
We then estimated the average treatment effect on treated (ATET) with 
regard to policy intervention with the matched sample. The performance 
indicator for the evaluation was based on the establishment-level TFP, 
and it measures the growth in TFP between 2008 and 2011. Standard 
errors were calculated using the method suggested by Imbens (2004). 
Step 5: We checked if the probability of receiving treatment was 014 in the 
support and also visually inspected the propensity score distribution by 
recipients and non-recipients to ensure that the second assumption for 
the PSME was met.15  
 
Tables 5, 6, and 7 as well as Graph 1 summarize the estimation result of the 
effects of the public procurement policy in 2009 on the productivity and 
survivability of SMEs. While the SME participants in public procurement in 2009 
enjoyed 10.67% higher productivity growth on average than those of the 
counterfactual situation for the same year, they show a lower TFP growth rate by 
6.63% and a higher survival rate by 3.45% compared to those of the hypothetical 
non-participants in 2011. Thus, public procurement had a positive effect only in the  
 
10Large establishments have zero probability of receiving government procurement advantages for SMEs. 
Including them in the sample also violates one of the assumptions of the analysis. 
11For economic capital, we use tangible assets excluding non-depreciating assets such as land. 
12This is based on the ninth standard industry classification by Statistics Korea. 
13This allows for utilizing firms in a similar industry as a control group. 
14No probability was less than 1.00e-06. 
15No propensity score distribution graph shows a violation of the PSME assumption. 
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TABLE 5—DIFFERENCE IN TFP GROWTH RATE (LOG TFP DIFFERENCE) BETWEEN  
2008 AND 2011 FOR 2009 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
 
TFP 
growth 
Standard 
Error Z p 
95% Confidence  
Interval 
PSME 
ATET -0.0663 0.02198 -3.02 0.003 -0.1094 -0.0232 
Note: Each small and medium-sized enterprise awarded a procurement contract in 2009 was matched with a 
control establishment according to a propensity score with the characteristics of 2008. 
 
TABLE 6—DIFFERENCE IN THE SURVIVAL RATE BETWEEN  
2008 AND 2011 FOR 2009 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
 
Survival 
Rate 
Standard 
Error Z p 
95% Confidence  
Interval 
PSME 
ATET 0.03457 0.01377 2.51 0.012 0.0076 0.0616 
Note: Each small and medium-sized enterprise awarded a procurement contract in 2009 was matched with a 
control establishment according to a propensity score with the characteristics of 2008. 
 
TABLE 7—DIFFERENCE IN THE TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY (TFP)  
GROWTH RATE (LOG TFP DIFFERENCE) BETWEEN 2008 AND 2009 FOR 2009 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
 
TFP 
growth 
Standard 
Error Z p 
95% Confidence  
Interval 
PSME 
ATET 0.1067 0.01615 6.61 0.000 0.075 0.1384 
Note: Each small and medium-sized enterprise awarded a procurement contract in 2009 was matched with a 
control establishment according to a propensity score with the characteristics of 2008. 
 
 
FIGURE 1. PROPENSITY SCORES FOR 2009 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PARTICIPATION 
Note: Each small and medium-sized enterprise awarded a procurement contract in 2009 
was matched with a control establishment according to a propensity score with the 
characteristics of 2008. 
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year they produced goods and services for the public sector; after two years, it had 
a negative effect on the productivity of establishments awarded contracts, where 
the survivability is increased by the procurement factor. 
Next, we conducted estimations for two sub-cases, i.e., between SMEs with an 
explicit benefit and those without a benefit, as a comparison. In the first case, we 
included only in the treatment group SMEs that explicitly enjoyed benefits in 
bidding by competing only with other SMEs, in line with government regulations 
intended to prevent large establishments from bidding. The other case was the 
complement of the first case, where SMEs win the bid without such support from 
the government. Therefore, we can check whether government regulations were 
better or worse with regard to their achieving the goal of helping SMEs to grow 
beyond normal competition. 
Tables 8, 9, and 10 indicate that the TFP growth of SMEs was indeed lower than 
the general estimate for SMEs when the SMEs had the explicit benefit of exclusive 
competition.  
The SMEs awarded a public procurement contract with the benefit of 
governmental regulation in 2009 showed a 12.21% increase in TFP for the year of 
the contract, 2009, but the productivity feel to −10.05% in two years. In contrast, 
the survivability increased by 9.58%, indicating that the SMEs could survive 
without improving their productivity as required by the market.  
 
TABLE 8—DIFFERENCE IN THE TFP GROWTH RATE (LOG TFP DIFFERENCE) BETWEEN  
2008 AND 2011 FOR 2009 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT (SME-EXCLUSIVE COMPETITION) 
 
TFP 
growth 
Standard 
Error Z p 
95% Confidence  
Interval 
PSME 
ATET -0.1005 0.0402 -2.50 0.012 -0.1793 -0.0217 
Note: Each SME awarded a procurement contract in 2009 with the benefit of SME-exclusive competition was 
matched with a control establishment according to a propensity score with the characteristics of 2008. 
 
TABLE 9—DIFFERENCE IN THE SURVIVAL RATE BETWEEN  
2008 AND 2011 FOR 2009 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PARTICIPATION (SME-EXCLUSIVE COMPETITION) 
 
Survival 
Rate 
Standard 
Error Z p 
95% Confidence  
Interval 
PSME 
ATET 0.0958 0.0234 4.09 0.000 0.0498 0.1417 
Note: Each SME awarded a procurement contract in 2009 with the benefit of SME-exclusive competition was 
matched with a control establishment according to a propensity score with the characteristics of 2008. 
 
TABLE 10—DIFFERENCE IN THE TFP GROWTH RATE (LOG TFP DIFFERENCE) BETWEEN  
2008 AND 2009 FOR 2009 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT (SME-EXCLUSIVE COMPETITION) 
 
TFP 
growth 
Standard 
Error Z p 
95% Confidence  
Interval 
PSME 
ATET 0.1221 0.0302 4.04 0.000 0.063 0.1812 
Note: Each SME awarded a procurement contract in 2009 with the benefit of SME-exclusive competition was 
matched with a control establishment according to a propensity score with the characteristics of 2008. 
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FIGURE 2. PROPENSITY SCORES FOR 2009 PUBLIC PPROCUREMENT PARTICIPATION 
(WITH THE BENEFIT OF SME-EXCLUSIVE COMPETITION) 
Note: Each small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) awarded a procurement contract 
with the benefit of SME-exclusive competition in 2009 was matched with a control 
establishment according to a propensity score with the characteristics of 2008. 
 
 
TABLE 11—DIFFERENCE IN THE TFP GROWTH RATE BETWEEN  
2008 AND 2011 FOR 2009 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT  
(WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF SME-EXCLUSIVE COMPETITION) 
 
Survival 
Rate 
Standard 
Error Z p 
95% Confidence  
Interval 
PSME 
ATET -0.0068 0.00264 -0.26 0.796 -0.0585 0.0449 
Note: Each SME awarded a procurement contract without the benefit of SME-exclusive competition in 2009 was 
matched with a control establishment according to a propensity score with the characteristics of 2008. 
 
TABLE 12—DIFFERENCE IN THE SURVIVAL RATE BETWEEN  
2008 AND 2011 FOR 2009 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PARTICIPATION  
(WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF SME-EXCLUSIVE COMPETITION) 
 
Survival 
Rate 
Standard 
Error Z p 
95% Confidence  
Interval 
PSME 
ATET 0.0398 0.0164 2.43 0.015 0.0077 0.0719 
Note: Each SME awarded a procurement contract without the benefit of SME-exclusive competition in 2009 was 
matched with a control establishment according to a propensity score with the characteristics of 2008. 
 
At this stage, we examine the complementary group, that is, SMEs awarded a 
procurement contract without the benefit of exclusive competition. Tables 11, 12, 
and 13 summarize the estimation results. 
The SMEs awarded a contract without the benefit of governmental regulation 
showed a 9.45% increase in their TFP for the year of the contract (2009), and 
though the productivity increase eroded in two years, the productivity change was  
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TABLE 13—DIFFERENCE IN THE TFP GROWTH RATE (LOG TFP DIFFERENCE) BETWEEN  
2008 AND 2009 FOR 2009 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT  
(WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF SME-EXCLUSIVE COMPETITION) 
 
TFP 
growth 
Standard 
Error Z p 
95% Confidence  
Interval 
PSME 
ATET 0.0945 0.0195 4.84 0.000 0.0562 0.1329 
Note: Each SME awarded procurement contract without the benefit of SME-exclusive competition in 2009 was 
matched with a control establishment according to a propensity score with the characteristics of 2008. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. PROPENSITY SCORES FOR 2009 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PARTICIPATION 
(WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF SME-EXCLUSIVE COMPETITION) 
Note: Each SME awarded a procurement contract without the benefit of SME-exclusive 
competition in 2009 was matched with a control establishment according to a propensity 
score with the characteristics of 2008. 
 
not as significantly negative as it was for the SMEs with this benefit. The 
survivability rose by 3.98%. 
The estimation results presented in this section strongly support the moral hazard 
hypothesis. In other words, if SMEs enjoy an additional benefit from the public 
procurement market to survive without the fierce competition they would otherwise 
face in the market, they may lower their efforts to improve their productivity. This 
can be interpreted as a type of moral hazard.  
Although the PSME model is a more legitimate model and is the main model 
used in this study, we also estimated multiple regression models for TFP as       
a robustness check. The results mostly concur with the PSME result, except      
for the fact that SMEs without exclusive contracts also showed significantly  
lower productivity than in the counterfactual result. However, this outcome 
(−4.81%) was lower than it was for SME-exclusive contracts (−11.57%) or  
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general cases (−7.31%). 
We used the following specification for the multiple regression analysis: 
 
,2011 2008 ,2009 ,2008 1 ,2008 2i i i i iY T X I          
 
where 
,2011 2008iY  : Establishment i ’s log TFP difference (TFP growth rate) between 
2008 and 2011 
,2009iT : Policy dummy variable; 1 if establishment i  had a procurement contract 
in 2009 and 0 otherwise  
,2008iX : Characteristics of establishment i  in 2008 
,2008iI : Industry control variables, characteristics of the two-digit level industry 
in which establishment i  is in as of 2008 
i : . . .i i d error for each establishment i . 
 
Table 14~19 summarizes the same three cases (all procurement contracts, SME-
exclusive bidding, and non-SME-exclusive bidding) analyzed with the PSME for 
the effects of a procurement contract in 2009 on 2009 and 2011. 
The estimation results from Table 14 and Table 15 are consistent with the results 
from the PSME. The productivity increased (10.43%p) for the very year (2009) 
they won the procurement bid, but the growth of the productivity for the recipients 
firms was even lower (-7.31%p) than that of other similar SMEs which did not win 
the bid after two years (2011). 
The estimation results from Table 16 and Table 17 are also consistent with the 
PSME results. The productivity went up (11.77%p) for the very year (2009) the 
firms won the procurement bid with the advantage of exclusive bidding, but the 
growth in productivity for these recipient firms was even lower (-11.57%p) than 
that by other similar SMEs which did not win the bid after two years (2011). 
 
TABLE 14—DIFFERENCE IN THE TFP GROWTH RATE (LOG TFP DIFFERENCE) BETWEEN  
2008 AND 2011 FOR 2009, ALL PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS 
2011~2008 
TFP growth 
All Contracts 
Coef. S.E. t p 95% C.I. 
Procurement (2009) -0.0731 0.0136 -5.39 0.000 -0.0997 -0.0465 
TFP (2008) -0.0052 0.0001 -56.05 0.000 -0.0054 -0.0051 
Number of Workers (2008) 0.0001 0.0001 0.77 0.439 -0.0002 0.0004 
Payment/Worker (2008) -0.0041 0.0004 -10.28 0.000 -0.0049 -0.0033 
Capital (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 4.69 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sales (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 10.74 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Operating Profit (2008) -0.0000 0.0000 -10.21 0.000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
Sales, Industry avg. (2008) -0.0000 0.0000 -0.81 0.421 0.0000 0.0000 
O.P., Industry avg. (2008) 0.0001 0.0000 6.93 0.000 0.0000 0.0001 
# of Workers, Ind. avg. (2008) -0.0000 0.0005 -0.02 0.985 -0.0011 0.0011 
Payment/worker, Ind. avg. (2008) 0.0112 0.0013 8.50 0.000 0.0086 0.0138 
Capital, Industry avg. (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 1.70 0.090 0.0000 0.0000 
Constant 0.0967 0.0288 3.36 0.001 0.0402 0.1532 
Adj R-squared 0.1703 
D. of F. 27,987 
INSIDabcdef_:MS_0001MS_0001
IN
SI
D
ab
cd
ef
_:
M
S_
00
01
M
S_
00
01
VOL. 39 NO. 1  An Empirical Study on the Effects of Public Procurement on the Productivity and Survivability of SMEs 15 
TABLE 15—DIFFERENCE IN THE TFP GROWTH RATE (LOG TFP DIFFERENCE) BETWEEN  
2008 AND 2009 FOR 2009 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, ALL PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS 
2009~2008 
TFP growth 
All Contracts 
Coef. S.E. t p 95% C.I. 
Procurement (2009) 0.1043 0.0109 9.54 0.000 0.0829 0.1258 
TFP (2008) -0.0036 0.0001 -52.64 0.000 -0.0037 -0.0035 
Number of Workers (2008) 0.0004 0.0001 3.79 0.000 0.0002 0.0006 
Payment/Worker (2008) -0.0049 0.0003 -16.27 0.000 -0.0055 -0.0043 
Capital (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 3.21 0.001 0.0000 0.0000 
Sales (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 13.12 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Operating Profit (2008) -0.0000 0.0000 -12.43 0.000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
Sales, Industry avg. (2008) -0.0000 0.0000 -0.04 0.970 0.0000 0.0000 
O.P., Industry avg. (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 6.39 0.000 0.0000 0.0001 
# of Workers, Ind .avg. (2008) -0.0007 0.0004 -1.78 0.075 -0.0016 0.0001 
Payment/worker, Ind .avg. (2008) 0.0045 0.0010 4.47 0.000 0.0025 0.0064 
Capital, Industry avg. (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 6.96 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Constant 0.1719 0.0216 7.97 0.000 0.1296 0.2142 
Adj R-squared 0.1107 
D. of F. 44,642 
 
TABLE 16—DIFFERENCE IN THE TFP GROWTH RATE (LOG TFP DIFFERENCE) BETWEEN 
2008 AND 2011 FOR 2009 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, SME-EXCLUSIVE BIDDING 
2011~2008 
TFP growth 
SME-exclusive bidding 
Coef. S.E. T p 95% C.I. 
Procurement (2009) -0.1157 0.0231 -5.00 0.000 -0.1611 -0.0704 
TFP (2008) -0.0053 0.0001 -56.15 0.000 -0.0054 -0.0051 
Number of Workers (2008) 0.0001 0.0001 0.64 0.523 -0.0002 0.0004 
Payment/Worker (2008) -0.0041 0.0004 -10.22 0.000 -0.0049 -0.0033 
Capital (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 4.75 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sales (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 10.77 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Operating Profit (2008) -0.0000 0.0000 -10.14 0.000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
Sales, Industry avg. (2008) -0.0000 0.0000 -0.67 0.505 -0.0000 0.0000 
O.P., Industry avg. (2008) 0.0001 0.0000 6.76 0.000 0.0000 0.0001 
# of Workers, Ind. avg. (2008) 0.0001 0.0005 0.14 0.885 -0.0010 0.0011 
Payment/worker, Ind avg. (2008) 0.0109 0.0013 8.29 0.000 0.0083 0.0135 
Capital, Industry avg. (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 1.54 0.124 -0.0000 0.0000 
Constant 0.0983 0.0288 3.41 0.001 0.0418 0.1548 
Adj R-squared 0.1702 
D. of F. 27,987 
 
TABLE 17—DIFFERENCE IN THE TFP GROWTH RATE (LOG TFP DIFFERENCE) BETWEEN  
2008 AND 2011 FOR 2009 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, SME-EXCLUSIVE BIDDING 
2009~2008 
TFP growth 
SME-exclusive bidding 
Coef. S.E. t p 95% C.I. 
Procurement (2009) 0.1177 0.0188 6.27 0.000 0.0809 0.1545 
TFP (2008) -0.0036 0.0001 -52.48 0.000 -0.0037 -0.0035 
Number of Workers (2008) 0.0004 0.0001 3.97 0.000 0.0002 0.0007 
Payment/Worker (2008) -0.0049 0.0003 -16.35 0.000 -0.0055 -0.0043 
Capital (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 3.10 0.002 0.0000 0.0000 
Sales (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 13.07 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Operating Profit (2008) -0.0000 0.0000 -12.51 0.000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
Sales, Industry avg. (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 -0.28 0.777 -0.0000 0.0000 
O.P., Industry avg. (2008) 0.0001 0.0000 6.59 0.000 0.0000 0.0001 
# of Workers, Ind. avg. (2008) -0.0009 0.0004 -2.11 0.035 -0.0017 -0.0001 
Payment/worker, Ind. avg. (2008) 0.0049 0.0010 4.96 0.000 0.0030 0.0069 
Capital, Industry avg. (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 7.35 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Constant 0.1697 0.0216 7.86 0.000 0.1274 0.2120 
Adj R-squared 0.1097 
D. of F. 44,642 
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TABLE 18—DIFFERENCE IN THE TFP GROWTH RATE (LOG TFP DIFFERENCE) BETWEEN  
2008 AND 2011 FOR 2009 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, NON-SME-EXCLUSIVE BIDDING 
2011~2008 
TFP growth 
Non-SME-exclusive bidding 
Coef. S.E. t p 95% C.I. 
Procurement (2009) -0.0481 0.016309 -2.95 0.003 -0.0801 -0.0161 
TFP (2008) -0.0052 0.0000 -56.11 0.000 -0.0054 -0.0051 
Number of Workers (2008) 0.0001 0.0001 0.75 0.456 -0.0002 0.0003 
Payment/Worker (2008) -0.004 0.0004 -10.20 0.000 -0.0055 -0.0033 
Capital (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 4.77 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sales (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 10.72 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Operating Profit (2008) -0.0000 0.0000 -10.18 0.000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
Sales, Industry avg. (2008) -0.0000 0.0000 -0.71 0.478 -0.0000 0.0000 
O.P., Industry avg. (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 6.85 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
# of Workers, Ind. avg. (2008) 0.0000 0.0005 0.17 0.865 -0.0010 0.0011 
Payment/worker, Ind. avg. (2008) 0.0109 0.0013 8.30 0.000 0.0083 0.0135 
Capital, Industry avg. (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 1.49 0.136 -0.0000 0.0000 
Constant 0.0965 0.0288 3.35 0.001 0.0400 0.1530 
Adj R-squared 0.1697 
D. of F. 27,987 
 
TABLE 19—DIFFERENCE IN THE TFP GROWTH RATE (LOG TFP DIFFERENCE) BETWEEN  
2008 AND 2009 FOR 2009 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, NON-SME-EXCLUSIVE BIDDING 
2009~2008 
TFP growth 
Non-SME-exclusive bidding 
Coef. S.E. t p 95% C.I. 
Procurement (2009) 0.0928 0.0131 7.06 0.000 0.0670 0.1186 
TFP (2008) -0.0036 0.0000 -52.56 0.000 -0.0044 -0.0035 
Number of Workers (2008) 0.0004 0.0001 3.78 0.000 0.000204 0.000642
Payment/Worker (2008) -0.0049 0.0003 -16.33 0.000 -0.00548 -0.0043 
Capital (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 3.11 0.002 0.0000 0.0000 
Sales (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 13.15 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Operating Profit (2008) -0.0000 0.0000 -12.44 0.000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
Sales, Industry avg. (2008) -0.0000 0.0000 -0.15 0.879 -0.0000 0.0000 
O.P., Industry avg. (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 6.42 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
# of Workers, Ind. avg. (2008) -0.0008 0.0004 -1.99 0.047 -0.0017 -0.0000 
Payment/worker, Ind. avg. (2008) 0.0047 0.0010 4.70 0.000 0.0027 0.0066 
Capital, Industry avg. (2008) 0.0000 0.0000 7.25 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Constant 0.1723 0.0222 7.98 0.000 0.1300 0.2146 
Adj R-squared 0.1099 
D. of F. 44,642 
 
Finally, Table 18 and Table 19 shows that the productivity of the SMEs increased 
(9.28%p) for the very year (2009) they won the procurement bid without the 
advantage of exclusive bidding, whereas the growth in the productivity for the 
recipients firms was lower (-4.81%p) than that of other similar SMEs which did not 
win the bid after two years (2011). Unlike the PSME result, the effect is negative 
and significant here, but the value (-4.81p%) is less than that for firms with the 
exclusive bidding advantage (-11.57%p). 
These results imply that the policy of providing SMEs with benefits to join the 
procurement market is not working as intended. A productive support policy for 
SMEs should be able to correct market failures so that SMEs can grow in a self-
reliant manner; however, our evaluation shows that recipient companies display 
much lower productivity than those who are not helped, when compared two years 
after participation. As participation in procurement has a positive productivity 
effect during the first year as compared with the productivity of the firm in the 
control group, we can exclude the possibility that the procurement contract is 
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indeed less favorable to the firm. Further, as the productivity performance in two 
years is worse than that of the non-recipients in the control group, we can assume 
that the procurement contract causes moral hazard of the recipient firm.  
In contrast, establishments that participated in public procurement for SMEs in 
2009 were more likely to survive than those that did not do so in 2011. These 
results can be interpreted as the negative consequences of government intervention; 
the market’s efficiency enhancement will be hindered if underserving companies 
survive owing to government intervention but fail to improve efficiency. 
  
V. Conclusion 
 
Although it is widely believed that public procurement can be a useful tool to 
help SMEs attain growth, we found that it can in fact harm the productivity and 
growth of the recipient SMEs owing to the possible moral hazard of the recipient 
firms. 
For a SME support policy, in general, the possibility of moral hazard is 
surprisingly neglected: the policy can also have unintended side effects on the firm 
by increasing dependency on the policy and retarding efforts to improve 
productivity. It is clearly an empirical question to check whether the policy is 
working as intended to boost SMEs or whether it has a negative effect on the 
performance of beneficiary firms. However, few empirical studies have rigorously 
analyzed this issue thus far. 
This paper uses of a comprehensive dataset from the PPS combined with the 
MMS from Statistics Korea, computes economic productivity as a performance 
indicator using the Levinsohn–Petrin production function estimation method, and 
adopts the PSME as a policy evaluation tool. These methods and databases are 
applied to find that public procurement for establishments with ten or more 
employees in the Korean mining and manufacturing sector in 2009 actually 
lowered the productivity of the participating establishments while the survivability 
of the beneficiary establishments increased in 2011. This finding supports the 
hypothesis that public procurement for SMEs is not functioning as intended and 
has impeded the market; the recipients evaded the choice between improving 
productivity to survive in the market and quitting to release the resources for a 
reorganization, instead choosing the new option of depending on the procurement 
market and surviving without improving their productivity to the level demanded 
by the market. 
The study’s findings suggest that the procurement policy for SMEs should be 
revisited and overhauled and that the government should pay more attention to the 
screening process of the recipients and should monitor their performance. The 
government tends to consider that the cost of providing firms with access to the 
procurement market is rather low, but the cost of distortion, as found in this study, 
should also be considered. 
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